How is france ruled

The general policy statement The general policy statement is a tradition in the Fifth Republic but is not an obligation laid down by the Constitution. Therefore, some Governments have never made such commitments and accordingly drew legitimacy solely from appointment by the President of the Republic, or, as in the case of the ninth parliament to because they did not have an absolute majority in the National Assembly.

However, since , all Governments have asked for a vote of confidence by the National Assembly within a few days of appointment. In particular, several Governments have asked for a vote of confidence by the National Assembly in relation to a special event. In total, Article 49, paragraph 1 has been exercised 35 times since Provisions of Article 49 of the Constitution Title V of the Constitution of 4 October covers relations between the Parliament and the Government Article 34 to In the event of a negative vote by the absolute majority of votes cast, the Government must resign; by the tabling of a censure motion by one-tenth of the members of parliament, adopted by the absolute majority of the members of the National Assembly.

The Government is consequently overturned; when the Government applies Article Members of parliament can table a censure motion and vote on it within 48 hours to object to legislation being adopted without a vote. In this case, the Government is also required to resign. Since the common agricultural policy falls within the Community's competence, action by the Community's competent institutions was required.

In line with that analysis, the Commission's representative stated at the hearing before the Court that a solution to the French farmers' problems had to be found in another context. In this connection, it is perhaps of interest to draw attention to the judgment which the Court gave on the action brought by the Federal Republic of Germany against the regulation on the common organization of the market in bananas.

In that judgment, the Court pointed out that one of the objectives of the Community legislature in that case was to reconcile the conflicting interests of certain Member States. The defendant has, it is true, pointed out in its rejoinder that it has been trying for years to bring about an appropriate reform of the common organizations of the markets in fruit and vegetables. In my opinion, however, it may not rely on the fact that no such measures have yet been adopted.

As long as no such changes have taken place, a Member State is precluded from taking action against persons who abide by the legislation in force. That is confirmed by a judgment of the Court dating from , which has some points of contact with the present case. It concerned imports of mutton and lamb from the United Kingdom, which France was preventing by applying a restrictive system to those imports.

The French Government did not dispute that that system was an obstacle to the free movement of goods. At the same time, it drew attention to the progress made in the work being carried out with a view to setting up a common organization of the market in mutton and lamb. The Court stated that it was fully aware of the problems of that sector in France. The argument that the United Kingdom, for its part, had maintained a national organization of the market in the same sector was also rejected.

A Member State cannot under any circumstances unilaterally adopt, on its own authority, corrective measures or measures to protect trade designed to prevent any failure on the part of another Member State to comply with the rules laid down by the Treaty. That means that such controversies are dealt with through the channels made available by Community law and, at last instance, settled by a court, in this case the Court of Justice.

However, it is not only unilateral measures — such as import prohibitions, for example — adopted in a legal form by Member States which are incompatible with a community of that nature. The same applies a fortiori to acts of violence and arbitrary acts. If violence were also allowed as a means of achieving certain economic and political objectives, the rule of law would be replaced by the rule of force.

That would also mean the end of the Community. As I have already stated, the Court has not expressly dealt with this issue up to now. I am, however, of the opinion that a judgment given in in an action brought by the Commission against the French Republic for failure to fulfil oblgations takes the same basic idea as its starting-point.

The French Republic had been granted certain anchovy catch quotas for the period in question. The French fishing vessels had substantially exceeded those quotas but the French authorities had taken no action against them, although they were obliged to do so under the relevant provisions of Community law.

Article 5 of the Treaty imposes a strict duty of cooperation on Member States to adopt all measures necessary to attain the objectives of the Treaty. In my opinion, that also applies to the Member States' general obligation arising from Article 5 to ensure the fulfilment of their obligations under the Treaty.

For all those reasons, therefore, if the acts of violence committed by private individuals in France against imports from other Member States could be attributed to the French Republic, they could on no account be justified.

The key issue in these proceedings must therefore now be resolved, namely, whether the French Republic can be held responsible for those disturbances and acts of violence. At the hearing before the Court, the French Government's representative submitted that, in this context, the principle which applied was that a Member State is not responsible for the behaviour of individuals. That principle applied both in Community law and in international law. There was, however, an exception to that principle.

However, in my opinion, this matter does not need to be considered in more detail here, since Community law offers, in Article 5 of the Treaty, a provision from which it may be seen that this problem is governed by a particular set of rules in the Community sphere.

Consequently, on the basis of Article 5 considered in isolation, the Commission's action would have as little prospect of success as it would on the basis of Article 30 alone. However, Article 5 of the EC Treaty also imposes particular duties with regard to the obligations arising out of Community law first paragraph and with regard to the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty second paragraph.

That applies also, and in particular, to the protection of the freedom in question against attacks by private individuals. That interpretation is borne out, on the one hand, by the Court's case-law and, on the other, by Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty. The case-law in question concerns a situation which is virtually the mirror image or opposite of the circumstances of this case. Articles 85 and 86 in themselves concern only the conduct of undertakings, that is, of private persons.

In order to ensure the practical effectiveness of the provisions establishing those duties, however, the Court has held that Community law also prohibits measures taken by Member States which would ultimately result in the same disadvantageous consequences for the protected legal interest in this case, competition as the actions of private individuals. For that reason, Member States are obliged to abstain from such measures. That logic can also be applied to the situation which exists in this case.

Article 30 31 prohibits measures by the Member States which could jeopardize the free movement of goods. As the present case clearly shows, however, the free movement of goods can also be jeopardized by actions committed by private individuals.

It is therefore necessary, for the protection of the practical effectiveness of Article 30, to infer from the Treaty a duty for Member States to combat such actions by private individuals. Such a duty is, of course, an obligation to act, that is, an obligation arising from the first paragraph of Article 5.

To all appearances, that interpretation also underlies the action brought by the Commission, even though the Commission does not give any further explanation in that regard. It seems to me that the United Kingdom Government also shares that view, although the mode of expression chosen by it — it refers to obligations under Article 30 and Article 5 — would also allow of another interpretation.

That such an interpretation is by no means alien to Community law is, in my opinion, implicit from a judgment given in The customs authorities also had offices there at which all the formalities normally completed at State frontiers could be carried out.

Garonor leased offices and other facilities to forwarding agents. According to the findings of the national court, a substantial proportion of that charge was intended to cover costs arising from the performance of tasks in the public interest. The Court came to the conclusion that such a charge was contrary to Articles 9 and 12 of die EC Treaty.

It attached no importance to the fact that, in that case, the charge in question was levied by a private undertaking:. In any event, however, the judgment shows that, subject to certain conditions, responsibility for the conduct of private individuals can be attributed to a Member State also in the sphere of the free movement of goods. The parallel which I have drawn with the Court's case-law on Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty can, moreover, be extended even further.

The effect of Articles 85 and 86 read in conjunction with Article 5 is not that a Member State should abstain from all measures which could jeopardize competition. However, as the Commission's representative put it at the hearing before the Court, it will at least be necessary to require it to take the steps necessary for the attainment of that objective.

It must therefore be examined whether France has fulfilled that obligation in this case. As the Commission has stated, a Member State faced with such a situation has, in principle, two ways in which it can protect the free movement of goods against attacks by private individuals.

First, it has the possibility, by deploying its forces of law and order, that is, in particular, its police, of taking action directly to deal with such attacks, whether by preventively protecting the targets of those attacks or by deploying its resources to combat such attacks as soon as they occur. Such action can be described, to adopt the phrase used by the Commission, as preventive measures. However, a Member State also has the possibility of bringing to account afterwards the perpetrators of such attacks by deploying the resources of the criminal law against them.

Such action can be succinctly described as penal measures. I agree with the Commission that neither it nor any other Community institution can prescribe what measures a Member State should apply in any specific case in order to protect the free movement of goods. That decision is a matter for the Member State concerned alone. In that regard, the view expressed by the French Government's representative at the hearing before the Court, that the Court must not encroach upon the Member States' discretion in the field of the preservation of public order and security by substituting its own assessment for that of the Member State concerned, is also fully justified.

It is for the Member State concerned to decide what resources it deploys to avert threats to the free movement of goods stemming from the actions of private individuals. However, the Court has the power to verify whether the Member State has taken all necessary and proportionate measures in that regard. It is true, however, that, as the United Kingdom has stated, it would probably only be in exceptional cases that a Member State could be said to be in breach of its obligations in that sphere.

In order to take account of the discretion which Member States undoubtedly have, it will in fact be possible to accept the existence of a failure to fulfil the obligations under Article 30, read in conjunction with Article 5, only when it is clearly and unambiguously established that a Member State has not taken all necessary and proportionate measures to protect the free movement of goods from acts of violence committed by private individuals.

With regard, firstly, to the question of preventive measures, the Commission complains that the defendant's police forces did not always intervene with the necessary speed and diligence.

At the time of the incidents in April , for example, those forces did not intervene at all in some cases, which may have been attributable either to inadequate resources or else to intentional passivity. At the hearing, the Commission drew attention to another incident, in June , which took place in the Marseilles area and involved some demonstrators.

On that occasion the forces of law and order were not deployed although they were certainly standing by in sufficient numbers. In addition, the Commission complains that the French authorities failed to make adequate use of the information available to them about imminent attacks. It concludes from all those factors that the response of the French authorities is inadequate in structural terms. The defendant, on the other hand, has already maintained in its defence that the government instructed the authorities, in a number of telegrams, to take all appropriate surveillance and protection measures to protect importers and traders.

Moreover, it consistendy condemned the acts of violence. As far as the events which occurred in April are concerned, the French authorities could not be accused of having acted in an intentionally passive way.

In its rejoinder the defendant has further argued that mobile units, which could intervene if necessary, were put on standby in the areas of the country particularly at risk.

At the hearing before the Court, the French Government's representative gave further details of those efforts and provided figures on the deployment of forces of law and order in In its rejoinder the defendant stated that consideration had also been given to providing individual lorries with a French police escort from the frontier onwards. However, at the hearing it explained that such individual protection would have been impossible on account of the large number of shipments being transported.

The defendant draws attention, in particular, to the difficulties encountered in the deployment of police, instancing the tactics employed by the demonstrators, of striking unexpectedly and quickly, which made intervention extremely difficult.

For example, the attack which took place on 3 June in Salon-de-Provence lasted ten minutes; the attackers had then fled immediately. Moreover, that incident showed that the demonstrators were extremely mobile. Those two factors and the severe imbalance of forces between the demonstrators and the police made any intervention by the latter impossible and also allowed no time to bring up reinforcements.

Finally, the defendant argues that the police authorities should have a margin of discretion in performing their delicate task of protecting public order and security. The Paris Conseil de l'Ordre argues that they do so, though it seems that in fact lawyers who are qualified in, and practise in other Member States, have become members of the Paris Bar.

There is also a lack of agreement about the position of French nationals who are members of the Paris Bar and who wish to apply to become members of other Bars. The Court of Appeal found that for a long time the usages of the Paris Bar have allowed French avocats to apply for membership of other bars of other countries.

The French Government in its written answer to a question from the Court said that there was no rule to prevent a member of the Paris Bar from being admitted to the Bar of another country. At the hearing, however, counsel for the French Government said that, although the Bars of other countries could admit French avocats, if their rules permitted it, it would violate the rules applicable in France for a French lawyer to become a member of the Bar of another country.

The Conseil de l'Ordre takes the position that a French lawyer practising in Paris cannot lawfully seek membership of another country's Bar and set up practice there. It is accepted, however, that no disciplinary proceedings have ever been taken. What is the correct interpretation of the rules applicable in Paris is obviously not for the Court to decide, even in relation to foreign lawyers. In view of the express finding of fact by the Court of Appeal and the evidence available to this Court, it seems, however, right to proceed on the basis that in fact, whether lawfully or not, some members of the Paris Bar do practise in other countries and have not been stopped or disciplined by the Conseil de l'Ordre.

The Conseil de l'Ordre accepts this basic premise as to the effect of Article It contends, however, that the right given goes no further than that of setting up one establishment. Here there is no discrimination on the basis of nationality and the rule is thoroughly justified in France for the administration of justice and the maintenance of professional codes of behaviour.

These submissions involve a consideration first of the general rule under Article 52 and then the submission that exceptions to the general rule may be justified. As to the former, it seems to me quite impossible to read Article 52 in the limited way first contended for. Although it does not say in terms that a person may be established in more than one Member State, that is plainly the intention.

Article 52 gives a right of establishment in another Member State; it does not take away any right which may exist in the national's own Member State.

Nor does it make renunciation of the latter the price of the former. The object of the general programme envisaged in Article 54 seems to me to give the key. It cannot be less so where a professional man wishes to set up practice after qualifying in two Member States even if the two practices are independent of each other. Nor should Article 52 be limited to restrictions which are defined expressly in terms of the nationality of the person wishing to establish a business or profession.

They are subsequently compare these extracts to some private correspondence from the time and a three extracts from a confidential report from the British Ambassador.

In the light of all of the evidence students, are asked to decide how seriously the British government took the events of They should be encouraged to evaluate the tone, attitude and perspective contained in all these extracts as they work through the questions.

Why were these accounts produced? Who would have seen them? What is their value to the historian? All documents are provided with transcripts. Students can work through the questions individually or in pairs and report back to the class. Potential activities: Students create a timeline for the French revolution using the sources here and their own research Download: Lesson pack Related resources Protest and democracy to , part 1 Was this the start of mass politics in Britain?

This website uses cookies We place some essential cookies on your device to make this website work. Set cookie preferences. Skip to Main Content. Search our website Search Discovery, our catalogue. View image description Storming of the Bastille and arrest of the Governor M.

View lesson as PDF. View full image. Lesson at a glance. Potential activities: Students create a timeline for the French revolution using the sources here and their own research Download: Lesson pack.

How did the British react to July ?