Why is chavez on google page

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Magnet Program. Click here for Dress Code Information. New to Chavez? View our Floor Plan Here. College and Career Readiness. PowerUp Laptop Agreements. Khan Academy. Skip to Main Content. District Home. Emergency reception facilities were made available to them by the municipality of The Hague. There is an access arrangement between Mr Arrey and his daughter. Philomena stays with her father for three weekends each month and sometimes spends the holidays with him.

Mr Arrey pays EUR every month in child maintenance. He also receives child benefit, which he passes on to Ms Enowassam. Mr Arrey has a full-time job, as a result of which he has stated he is not able to look after his daughter. Ms Guerrero Chavez, a Venezuelan national, arrived in the Netherlands on 24 October and then returned to Venezuela on 2 November She came back to the Netherlands in January and is currently resident in Schiedam Netherlands.

Salomo was born from her relationship with Mr Maas, a Netherlands national, on 31 March Mr Maas acknowledged the child, who thereby acquired Netherlands nationality. Mr Maas has almost daily contact with the child but is not prepared to take care of him and makes a limited contribution towards expenses. Ms Guerrero Chavez takes day-to-day care of her son and has custody of him.

During the periods in the course of which the abovementioned benefit applications were rejected 5 the applicants had their applications for a residence permit, within the meaning of the Law on Foreign Nationals, refused.

Some of the parties concerned were lawfully resident at the time since it was, essentially, the period during which they were waiting for a decision on their applications for a residence permit. The other parties concerned were not lawfully resident in the Netherlands during part of the time in question and should have left the Netherlands of their own accord.

No measures were taken to deport them. The applicants were not entitled to work. The applicants lodged appeals with the Centrale Raad van Beroep Higher Social Security Court against the decisions refusing their entitlement to the benefits sought. The referring court raises the question whether the applicants, who are all third-country nationals, each being the mother of a child who is a Union citizen, may, in the circumstances described above, derive a right of residence under Article 20 TFEU.

It considers that if that were the case the applicants would potentially, by virtue of the Law on Social Assistance and the Law on Child Benefit, be entitled to benefits under those laws. In that regard, the referring court infers from the judgments in Ruiz Zambrano 6 and Dereci and Others 7 that the applicants have a direct right of residence based on Article 20 TFEU, derived from the right of residence of their child, since that child is in a situation similar to that referred to in those judgments.

It considers that it should be determined whether the circumstances are such that the child would be obliged in practice to leave the territory of the European Union if the mother is denied a right of residence. The referring court asks, in the circumstances of the cases in the main proceedings, how much weight should be given, in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice, to the fact that the father who is a Union citizen, resides in the Netherlands.

It is in that context that the Centrale Raad van Beroep Higher Social Security Court , by judgment of 16 March , received at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 18 March , decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:. At the request of the referring court, the President of the Court decided that the present case should be given priority, in accordance with Article 53 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.

I shall examine first of all the premisses on which the referring court based its order for reference, before analysing the main aspects of the questions it puts to the Court. I should like to point out first of all that the national court alone has jurisdiction to find and assess the facts in the case before it and to interpret and apply national law. In those circumstances, I shall carry out my analysis in three stages. First, I shall make reference to the principle of the primacy of the best interests of the child.

Secondly, in order to have a better understanding of the situations at issue in the main proceedings, I shall examine the differences between those situations. Thirdly, I shall describe the background to those situations, setting out the considerations of the referring court with regard to the Netherlands legislation and administrative practice and to the outcome of the applications for residence of the applicants in the main proceedings in the proceedings brought under the Law on Foreign Nationals.

The primacy of the best interests of the child is one of the principles permeating the EU legal order. The rights of the child are also enshrined in the Charter. In that regard, the Court has held that the principle of the primacy of the best interests of the child is the prism through which the provisions of EU law must be read.

The first point to make is that when one examines the situations at issue in the main proceedings it is obvious that they are not all the same. As is clear from the order for reference, the eight applicants in the main proceedings are third-country nationals, without valid residence permits, 18 and mothers of at least one young child aged between three and seven years who is a Union citizen residing in his or her own Member State, in this case the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Those children have in each case been acknowledged by their father, a Netherlands national, but live with their mother, who is responsible for their day-to-day and primary care. In each situation the father did not any longer live with the child and the mother as a family at the time the benefit applications in question were rejected. Besides those similarities, the situations at issue in the main proceedings exhibit a number of specific features that should be borne in mind.

Thus, as regards, first of all, the situation of the fathers who are Netherlands nationals, their contribution to the maintenance costs of their respective children and the custody of those children, it is clear from the order for reference that in some cases there was frequent contact, 19 and in other cases there was very little or no contact 20 between the child and the father.

In one case, the father could not be traced 21 and in another he was in a supported living scheme. As regards, next, the situation of the applicants in the main proceedings in the territory of the Union , it is also apparent from the order for reference that on 17 May Ms Pinas was granted a permit to reside in the Netherlands for a fixed period.

Ms Wip recently obtained a permit to reside in Belgium, where she is working and living with her daughter. Lastly, so far as the specific situations of the respective daughters of Ms Chavez-Vilchez and Ms Wip are concerned, both appear to have exercised their right of free movement.

I shall return later to the impact of those aspects for the cases in the main proceedings. As regards, first, the practice of the administrative authorities , the referring court states that, in the Netherlands, various administrative authorities interpret the judgments in Ruiz Zambrano 30 and Dereci and Others 31 restrictively and take the view that that case-law is applicable only where the father who is a Netherlands national, measured by objective criteria, would be unable to care for the child who is a Netherlands national, for example, if he were in detention, in an institution or clinic, or deceased.

Outside of those situations, the third-country national parent must make a plausible case to show that the father who is a Netherlands national is not able, even with the help of others, to care for the child. According to the referring court, the Circular on Foreign Nationals provides that the burden of proof that the parent who is a Netherlands national would not in fact be able to care for the child who is a Netherlands national lies with the third-country national parent.

The referring court adds that, in the disputes in the main proceedings, the bodies responsible for payment of the assistance and benefits, namely the Colleges of Aldermen concerned and the SvB, were required to conduct an investigation to the requisite standard, in consultation with the IND, on the basis of the information supplied by the parties concerned, into whether a right to reside in the Netherlands can be derived from Article 20 TFEU.

In a number of cases the IND has provided an opinion on request to those bodies. In some cases a judgment had already been handed down in proceedings under the Law on Foreign Nationals brought by one of the applicants. As regards, secondly, applications for a residence permit in the context of proceedings under the Law on Foreign Nationals, the referring court explains that, in the present case, the Colleges of Aldermen concerned, the SvB and the IND did not consider relevant the fact that the day-to-day and primary care of the child who is a Union citizen rested not with the father who was a Union citizen but with the mother who was a third-country national.

Nor was the fact that the father did not have custody of the child considered relevant as no plausible case was made to show that custody could not be awarded to him. The burden of proof that the parent who is a Netherlands national would not in fact be able to care for the child lies with the third-country national parent.

Only where the mother who is a third-country national makes a plausible case to show that there are objective obstacles precluding the father from caring for the child will it be assumed that the child is so dependent on her that the child will be obliged in practice to leave the territory of the European Union if that parent is denied a right of residence. In view of the differences between the situations at issue in the main proceedings and the specific aspects of Netherlands administrative practice detailed by the referring court in its order for reference, it is necessary to determine whether young children who are Union citizens, and their third-country national mothers who are their sole carers, come within the scope of EU law.

As the Court has consistently held, even though, formally, the referring court has limited its questions to the interpretation of Article 20 TFEU alone, such a situation does not prevent the Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of EU law which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case before it, whether or not that court has specifically referred to them in its questions.

That right covers, as I mentioned in point 46 of this Opinion, a young child who is a Union citizen. Since Ms Chavez-Vilchez is now working in Belgium and, consequently, it cannot be excluded that she is resident in that Member State with her daughter, it should be pointed out that, in view of the fact that Ms Chavez-Vilchez recently obtained a permit to reside in the Netherlands under Article 8 ECHR, the impact of any residence in Belgium would be relevant only in two circumstances: either in respect of any application for a permit to reside in that Member State or, in view of her lawful residence in the Netherlands, in order to assess the criteria for interpreting Article 20 TFEU, as laid down in the case-law of the Court.

Such an analysis might be of assistance to the referring court because of its impact on the periods to which the benefit applications at issue in the main proceedings relate. In that case, it is appropriate nonetheless to examine the situation of the child who is a Union citizen and his third-country national relative in the ascending line in the light of Article 20 TFEU. However, since Ms Wip has obtained a residence permit and has a job in Belgium, which are matters for the referring court to ascertain, her daughter, who is a Union citizen, cannot be obliged in practice to leave the territory of the European Union altogether, thus denying her the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by her citizenship.

Consequently, as in the case of Ms Chavez-Vilchez who has obtained a permit to reside in the Netherlands and of her daughter, I do not consider it necessary to analyse that situation in the light of Article 20 TFEU. It is necessary, in order to answer those questions, to determine, in the light of Article 20 TFEU and of the case-law of the Court, whether such a situation falls within the scope of EU law. On 1 November Union citizenship will be 23 years old.

Thus, Union citizenship legitimises the process of European integration by strengthening their participation as citizens. That legitimation has been highlighted at the Court, by its Advocates General, since the introduction of Union citizenship.

Admittedly the concept embraces aspects which have already largely been established in the development of Community law and in this respect it represents a consolidation of existing Community law. However, it is for the Court to ensure that its full scope is attained.

Since then, citizenship of the Union has progressively been made an effective reality by means of a vast jurisprudential endeavour, which the Court has carried out in close cooperation with national courts in the context of references for a preliminary ruling.

They concern essentially the interpretation of Article 20 TFEU in the light of the judgments in Ruiz Zambrano 62 and Dereci and Others 63 in situations, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, where it has not been established that the parent, who is a citizen of the Member State of which the child is a national and in which he has always resided, is able to care for the child in the event of the third-country national parent being deported.

On the other hand, can we regard the situations at issue in the main proceedings as coming within the scope of Article 20 TFEU? In that connection, I note that in the judgment in Ruiz Zambrano the Court ruled that Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union. The possible deportation of their mothers would deny them the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by their status of citizen of the European Union.

Accordingly, such denial might undermine the effectiveness of the Union citizenship they enjoy. In that context, it is necessary to assess, in the light of Article 20 TFEU, whether situations such as those at issue in the main proceedings constitute specific situations within the meaning of the abovementioned case-law. There is no doubt in my mind that the fact that those children all have the nationality of a Member State, namely the Netherlands, the conditions for acquiring which very clearly fall within the sphere of competence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 69 means that they have the status of citizen of the Union.

Consequently, in principle, it seems clear to me from the information available to the Court that the situations at issue in the main proceedings constitute specific situations within the meaning of the case-law stemming from the judgment in Ruiz Zambrano. I therefore consider that those situations come within the scope of EU law. In those circumstances, it is therefore necessary to determine whether the national decisions at issue in the main proceedings constitute interference with the right of residence enjoyed by the children concerned and whether it is justifiable.

It is clear to me that there would be potential interference with the rights of the children concerned, being Union citizens, if, as a result of the refusal of a residence permit for their mothers, those children were obliged, in practice, to leave the territory of the Union altogether. But is such interference acceptable or not in the specific circumstances of the situations at issue?

The first question which arises is whether the mere presence of the father, a Netherlands national, in the Netherlands 73 automatically precludes the child who is a Union citizen from receiving the protection of Article 20 TFEU, as interpreted by the case-law of the Court. In the context of compliance with the principle of proportionality, several interests are concerned, namely, national immigration interests, 75 the rights of Union citizens, the best interests of the child and rights under national family law, for example, the right of custody.

Thus, in order to determine whether the national decisions in question comply with the principle of proportionality, several factors must be taken into account, the most important being, in my view, the extent of the dependence between the third-country national parent and the child who is a Union citizen. The L. Times holiday gift guide. Newsom returns to public eye after sudden absence sparked social media speculation. Colonialism, power and race. Inside California ethnic studies classes.

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